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Abstract
In order to explain how the Korean economy underwent the structural change
through the two crises of 1997-8 and 2008 within the context of globalization, this
article focuses on class analysis and inter-sectoral value transfer by estimating the sec-
toral rates of exploitation along with the sectoral monetary expressions of labor time.
Our data indicate the possibility that the expansion of unproductive activities, accom-
panied by intensification of exploitation within the unproductive sectors, might not
have overtaken capital accumulation in Korea during 1995–2015. It can also be con-
cluded that the condition for manufacturing’s capital accumulation steadily improved
since the 1997–8 crisis, but started to deteriorate after 2011. Our value–theoretic anal-
ysis provides a foundation for understanding the context of the regime change, which
may plausibly characterize the Korean economy last couple of decades.
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1 Introduction
The momentum of the neoliberal structuration of the Korean economy critically accelerated
as a result of the 1997–8 financial crisis. Two recent decades since the crisis saw an enormous
increase in non–regular employment through the flexibilization of labor market, which deep-
ens income inequality, and an ever increasing importance of financial elements in everyday
life as well as capital accumulation. Suffice it to say that 2008 global financial crisis gave
further impetus to this tendency.
With high exposure to globalization, the internationalization of productive capital such
as FDI and market opening came to be crucial explanatory factors for the change in the rate
of profit (Hong, 2013). At the same time, some favorable conditions were established for the
conventional export–led growth strategy; export–biased productivity growth, suppression of
wage and undervalued exchange rate (Uni, 2017).
In this setting, it is important to explain how the Korean economy underwent the struc-
tural change through the two crises of 1997–8 and 2008 within the context of economic
globalization. We approach this challenging task from the Marxian perspective focusing
upon the distinction between productive and unproductive activities and the estimation of
the rate of surplus value at the industry level. This article aims to give a sketch of the
structural change in the Korean economy during 1995–2015 by providing indicators based
upon Marxian labor theory of value.
The main contributions of this article are summarized in two points. First, we estimate
Marxian ratios of the Korean economy both at the macro–level and the sectoral level within
the framework of the ‘New Interpretation’ (NI) of Marxian value theory as presented in
Duménil (1980) and Foley (1982). Based on the central thesis of Marxian labor theory of
value that money value added is the result of expenditure of living labor, the NI proposes to
accept the equivalence between the two at the aggregate level as an axiom. The associated
proportionality coefficient — called the monetary expression of labor time — can be used
in converting between price categories and Marx’s labor value categories, thereby allowing
one to recover the latter directly from the former. This has opened up new areas of research
program in Marxian literature to empirically test Marx’s hypotheses and estimate Marxian
ratios, using readily available real world data such as national income accounts as done in
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this paper.1
When applying the NI to the Korean data, we explicitly consider the distinction between
productive and unproductive labors and the decomposition of the income of self–employed
into capital income and labor income. The latter is particularly crucial since the share
of the self–employed sector in the Korean economy is significantly high; around 30% of
the total working population during 1995–2015. In the literature of Marxian value theory,
labor income of the self–employed is usually counted as the wage equivalent (Shaikh and
Tonak, 1994). Considering that most self–employed persons have scarce opportunity for
average salary paid jobs, however, this approach necessarily tends to underestimate the rate
of surplus value. Per capita income of the self–employed persons started to fall short of the
average income of wage workers around 1993 in Korea. Since then, the gap between the two
has been widening continuously except for the short period of 1997–8 crisis.
Secondly, based on the confirmation, through panel unit root tests, that the hypothesis
of equalization of the sectoral rates of surplus value does not hold for the Korean economy
during 1995–2015, we propose a novel approach to estimate the rate of surplus value at the
industry level that relies on the method of the ‘inverse transformation’ of price variables
into value variables. More specifically, we first estimate the labor share in income of each
productive industry — which is a price variable — by using the approach suggested in Joo
and Jeon (2014), and then use it to derive the sectoral rates of surplus value — which is a
value variable.
As we incorporate the decomposition of income of the self–employed sector to the estima-
tion of the sectoral rates of exploitation, there may be an objection that self–employed do not
produce surplus value as they are not ‘capitalistically employed’. However, it can be safely
said that they are subsumed under the overarching nexus of the capital–labor relation. In
particular, many of them are ‘economically dependent workers’ in that their labor processes
1This is one of the advantages of the NI over the other interpretations of Marxian value theory and the
main reason why we adopt it as a framework for the empirical analysis in this paper. It is well recognized
that there is a critique of the NI that it explains values from prices rather than the other way around and
thus that “the whole relation between surplus value and profit is turned on its head ” (Shaikh and Tonak,
1994, p. 179). However, this view is misdirected since in the NI the labor value categories are not determined
by, but recovered from the price categories.
3
are controlled and supervised by capital, although their legal statuses are ‘the self–employed’
(Oostveen et al., 2013).
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we first compute Piketty
(2014)’s capital–income ratio for the Korean economy, and provide an alternative reading
based upon the capital–labor class analysis; for this we conduct profit rate analysis for the
entire economy and the manufacturing industry. In section 3, Marxian value ratios at the
macroeconomic level are measured. Marxian value ratios at the industry level are estimated
in section 4. Section 5 concludes the article.
2 An alternative reading of Piketty
We start with outlining how inequality in the Korean economy has developed through the
neoliberal structuration. On one hand, the global phenomena of expansion of income and
wealth inequality pointed out by Piketty (2014) has been markedly observed in Korea as well
during 1995–2015. As displayed in figure 1, Piketty’s β, i.e. capital–income ratio, declined
in the aftermath of the 1997–8 crisis and started to rise considerably in early 2000.2 It
decreased somewhat right after the 2008 crisis but has still been exhibiting an upward trend.
The income distribution can be examined from a different perspective, in relation to
productivity and profitability of capital by relying on the following decomposition formula
of the rate of profit.
r = P
K
= Y
K
P
Y
(1)
where r, K, P , and Y , denote the rate of profit, capital stock, profits, and output, respec-
tively. The evolutions of r, Y
K
, capital productivity, and P
Y
, profit share, during the sample
period are illustrated in figure 2.3 Figure 2 confirms Rieu and Joo (2014)’s result about the
profit rate dynamics of the Korean economy that a rise in profit share constantly offset a
2Sources of the data used in the article are explained in appendix and details of estimations are found in
the note of each figure.
3Two comments: First, we computed the capital share of national income by following Joo and Jeon
(2014)’s method, i.e. to decompose the operating surplus of self–employed, unincorporated sector — which
is officially categorized as capital income — into capital income and labor income according to the profit–
wage ratio of the corporated sector. Second, the measure of the profit rate in figure 2 assumes away the
distinction between productive and unproductive labors. When the distinction is taken into consideration,
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Figure 1: Piketty’s β (1995–2016)
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(We used private non–financial assets for capital and, for income, net national income.)
decline in capital productivity thereby preventing the falling tendency of the rate of profit
from unfolding. In other words, strengthening of class power of capital played a vital role in
avoiding the tendency of the profit rate to fall in the Korean economy. This dynamics has
changed since 2010 when the capital productivity leveled off while both the rate of profit
and the capital share in income started to decrease.
In all, figures 1 and 2 indicate that the capital–income ratio, the profit share, and the
rate of profit shared the similar secular trend during the whole sample period in the Korean
economy. This result partly corresponds to Thomas Piketty’s thesis on the comovement of
wealth–income ratio and profit share. Piketty (2014) suggests that the positive correlation
between the two is due to an elasticity of substitution being greater than one. However, data
collected in the literature contradict Piketty’s argument, making it empirically weak; see,
e.g., Semieniuk (2017). Rather, that the class struggle developed in favor of capital through
neoliberal structuration provides a better explanation at least for the Korean economy during
this period.
As can be seen in figure 3, manufacturing is still a dominant and growing industry
however, the wage of unproductive industries will need to be added to the numerator of the profit rate as
part of total surplus value. We will start to incorporate the productive–unproductive labor distinction into
our analysis from the next section.
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Figure 2: The rate of profit, capital productivity, and profit share: all industries, 1995–2016
(1995=1)
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(Capital = structures + equipment. Capital can be measured differently; for instance, net
financial assets can be added or residential property can be subtracted. We tried various
combinations of these and there wasn’t any significant difference in the overall trends.)
Figure 3: Manufacturing’s value added as a percentage of GDP: South Korea and the other major
trading partners
(Data source: World Bank)
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in Korea; while the world and the major trading partners experienced a decline in the
share of manufacturing in GDP during 1995–2015, it increased in Korea during the same
period except for 2011 and after. By implication, understanding the performance of the
manufacturing industry would provide an essential clue in explaining the structural change
of the Korean economy which took place during 1995–2015.
In this setting, the profit rate of manufacturing is analyzed in the similar manner as above
and the result is reported in figure 4.4 There are a couple of interesting results to note in
comparison to the case of the whole industries. First, manufacturing’s capital productivity
stabilized after the 1997–8 crisis, which contrasts to the significant downfall of the capital
productivity in the case of the whole industries. Second, the upward trend of profit share of
manufacturing is more pronounced than that of the entire industries. As a consequence, the
performance of manufacturing’s profitability has been stronger and less volatile than that
of the whole industries; over the entire sample period, it has witnessed an upward trend
followed by stabilization until 2011 when it started to fall; however, the decline was not as
severe as that of the whole industries.
By inspecting the average annual rates of change of each variable, the entire sample period
can be divided into two sub–periods, 1996–2010 and 2011–2015, while the first sub–period
can be further divided into 1996–1998 and 1999–2010, as summarized in table 1.
First of all, the impact of the 1997–8 crisis on the profitability of manufacturing, reflected
in the average annual rate of –0.44% during 1996–1998, was mild compared to –13.1% for
the economy, whereas the consequence on the capital productivity was fatal for both the
whole economy and manufacturing, –8.24% and –8.46%, respectively. It was due to the
considerably strong profit share, 8.55%, the manufacturing industry achieved during this
crisis episode.
Second, the sub–period 1999–2010 was a long phase of recovering from, and reversing,
the crisis effects on profitability and productivity of capital for both manufacturing and the
economy; but this trend was more pronounced in the manufacturing sector. In either case,
4In Hong (2013), the manufacturing industry’s output–capital ratio, which corresponds to our capital
productivity, was in an upward trend from the 1997–8 crisis to 2009. This difference can possibly be
explained by that Hong (2013) measures the ratio in real terms while we uses nominal terms, and that Hong
(2013) uses value added while we use net national income.
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Figure 4: The rate of profit, capital productivity, and profit share: manufacturing, 1995–2016
(1995=1)
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Capital = structures + equipment + intellectual property products.
Table 1: The annual rates of change of the rate of profit, capital productivity, and profit share:
whole industries and manufacturing (%)
Whole economy Manufacturing
profit rate capital
productivity
profit share profit rate capital
productivity
profit share
1996–2010 –0.10 –2.42 2.12 3.20 –0.79 3.80
1996–1998 –13.11 –8.24 –5.30 –0.44 –8.46 8.55
1999–2010 3.15 –0.96 3.96 4.11 1.12 2.61
2011–2015 –2.42 –0.40 –2.02 –7.70 –2.01 –5.85
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however, the recovery of the profit rate from the 1997–8 crisis was possible mainly due to
the profit share.
Third, the increase in the profitability of manufacturing at the average annual rate of
3.20% during 1996–2010 stands out in comparison to –0.10% of the whole economy. Note
that this happened when the capital productivity not only of the whole economy but also
of manufacturing recorded negative average annual rate of change. Contrarily, the period
2011–2015 is marked by a rapid fall of manufacturing’s profitability at the pace of –7.70%
amidst stagnant performance of both profit rate and capital productivity across industries.
This can be well explained by the fact that manufacturing witnessed a solid profit share,
3.80% during 1996–2010, whereas it recorded the worst number for its profit share, –5.85%,
during 2011–2015.
The empirical observations thus far point to the importance of the dynamics of class
conflict reflected in the profit share. In particular, several differences documented above be-
tween manufacturing and the entire industries will provide crucial insights in understanding
the structural change of the Korean economy.
3 Marxian value analysis: macro–level
To further pursue our discussion from the previous section on the class conflict on the distri-
bution of national income, we study historical developments of Marxian ratios in the Korean
economy, such as the value of labor power and the rate of exploitation at the macro–level
from the perspective of the New Interpretation (NI) of Marxian value theory. In comparison
to our discussion in the previous section, we add two extensions. First, the distinction be-
tween productive and unproductive labors is explicitly incorporated to the analysis.5 This
distinction is specific to the Classical and Marxian theories of value. Even in the literature
on Marxian value theory, some are skeptical about the logical consistency and the ana-
lytical usefulness of the distinction; see. e.g. Laibman (1999). However, as shown later,
some characteristic pattern of the capital accumulation in Korea can be captured using the
5The productive industries include agriculture, forestry, and fishery; mining; manufacturing; utilities; con-
struction; accommodation and food service; transportation and warehousing; information services; education
service; arts and entertainment.
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distinction. We adopt the conventional definition of productive labor as “wage labor that
exchanges against capital and is employed in the productive phase of the circuit of capital
rather than in the realization or financial phases” (Foley, 2013, p.261).
Second, considering the fact that the share of the self–employed, unincorporated sector is
large in the Korean economy and that the social and economic conditions of the self–employed
are quite weak, we decompose the income of this sector — which is officially categorized as
profit — into capital income and labor income when measuring the income distribution.
In doing this, we follow Joo and Jeon (2014) and decompose the mixed income, which is
another name for the income of the self–employed sector, according to the ratio between
capital income and labor income in the incorporated sector.6
To begin with, according to the NI, the value of labor power (VLP) and the rate of
exploitation, denoted by e, are defined as follows, respectively.7
e = m
w
− 1 (2)
V LP = w
m
(3)
where w denotes a wage rate and m the monetary expression of labor time (MELT). When
computing the exploitation rate and the value of labor power according to equations (2) and
(3), we measure the two key parameters, w and m, by explicitly considering the productive–
unproductive labor distinction along with the decomposition of the mixed income. In the
case of w, on one hand, it is not the total wage of the whole economy that is counted but
only of the productive sectors plus the labor share of the mixed income. Let us denote the
latter by wP , which then should replace w in equations (2) and (3).
Similarly, on the other hand, with the definition of the MELT being the ratio between
aggregate value added and total labor time, there are two issues that can be considered
related to the denominator of the MELT. First, one can count 1© only productive labors as
in Mohun (2006) and Cogliano (2017) or 2© the entire labors, productive or unproductive.
1© is a more standard approach in Marxian literature and it is consistent with Foley (1986).
6The underlying assumption is that the the labor share in income is identical between the incorporated
and unincorporated sectors.
7See Mohun (2006) for a summary of the theoretical framework of the NI in the context of an empirical
analysis.
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Figure 5: The monetary expression of labor time (1995–2015)
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(We used net national income for the aggregate money value added in the numerator of the MELT and
the total labor time of the productive industries is computed by ‘the annual number of employed and self–
employed × monthly average of working time × 12’ for the productive industries as a whole.)
Second, one can A© take the productive–unproductive labor distinction as equivalent to the
productive–unproductive industry distinction as in Cogliano (2017) or B© apply the class
concept to the productive–unproductive labor distinction thereby categorizing a supervisory
labor as unproductive as in Mohun (2006). In this article, we adopt the 1©−A© combination.8
In addition, we take the labor of self–employed as productive. In all, denoting the aggregate
monetary value added by MVA and total labor time of the whole productive sectors and
those of the whole unproductive sectors, respectively, by LP and LU , the MELT can be
expressed as MVA
L−LU where L = LP + LU .
In order to visualize the consequence of counting the labor of self–employed in the de-
nominator of the MELT as productive, we illustrate in figure 5 two different versions of the
MELT, one that counts the labor of self–employed as productive and the other that does
not. In either cases, the MELT constantly rises until 2011 after which it slows down and
stagnates. Yet the gap between the two measures of the MELT tends to get widened after
8While B© could be a useful approach in separating out the supervisory labor from the productive labor
as shown in Sung (2007) and Jeong (2015), it is difficult to apply without some restrictive assumptions since
Survey Report on Labor Conditions by Employment Type published by Ministry of Employment and Labor
is based on sample, but complete, inspection.
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Figure 6: Rate of surplus value and profit–wage ratio, 1995–2015
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(The numerator of the profit–wage ratio is measured by operating surplus including income receipt on
assets from the rest of the world minus the labor income of self–employed, while the denominator is
measured by employment compensation including wage and salary receipt from rest of the world plus the
labor income of self–employed.)
the 1997-8 crisis. This result partly reflects that the productivity of the self–employed sector
has been sluggish.
Now we can plot the historical trajectories of the rate of exploitation and the value of
labor power. On one hand, the exploitation rate expressed in equation (2) is now replaced
by
e = m
wP
− 1 = MVA/LP
wP
− 1 = MVA
WP
− 1 (4)
where WP = wPLP is the total wage of the productive sectors. While the exploitation rate
expressed in equation (2) is identical to the aggregate profit–wage ratio, the one in equation
(4) is not, since the wage in the unproductive sectors is counted in the numerator of the
exploitation rate and the labor share of the mixed income is added to the denominator.
Therefore, the overall trends of the two ratios are usually different from each other in the
case of the U.S. economy as shown in Shaikh and Tonak (1994). In the case of the Korean
economy, figure 6 demonstrates that both the exploitation rate and the profit–wage ratio
experienced an upward trend while the gap between the two has grown over time.
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Figure 7: The value of labor power, 1995–2015
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0.
36
0.
38
0.
40
0.
42
0.
44
By the same logic, the value of labor power in equation (3) is now replaced by
V LP = wP
MELT
= wP
MVA/LP
= WP
MVA
(5)
The value of labor power measured accordingly is illustrated in figure 7. It underwent a
precipitous fall during the two crisis episodes, in 1997–8 and 2008. While it seems to have
been reversing the course in recent years since 2010, it hasn’t recovered the pre–crisis level.
When the productive–unproductive labor is explicitly considered as in this article, a
discrepancy between the value of labor power and the labor share of national income emerges,
which is in contrast to the definition in equation (3), where there is no such discrepancy. As
the value of labor power is computed in relation to the total wage of the productive labors
only, instead of the total wage of the whole labors, the value of labor power is necessarily
smaller than the labor share of income. To see this formally, let us denote the labor share
by LS, which then can be expressed as, by definition,
LS = WP +WU
MVA
(6)
Combining equations (5) and (6) yields
V LP = WP
WP +WU
LS = 1
1 + WU
WP
LS (7)
which conforms to that VLP < LS holds and, moreover, that their difference depends on the
relative volume of total wage between the productive and unproductive sectors, i.e. WU/WP .
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Figure 8: The value of labor power and the labor share in income, 1995–2015 (1995=1)
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Figure 8 compares the developments of the value of labor power and the labor share
in income.9 While their secular trends are similar to each other, the value of labor power
declined at a faster rate than the labor share did in the aftermath of the 19997–8 crisis but,
after early 2000s, the pace of the decline reversed, the labor share now falling more rapidly
than the value of labor power. Interestingly, as shown in figure 9a, the share of value added
of the unproductive sectors constantly increased until mid–2000s, but stabilized afterwards.
The results in figures 8 and 9a combined together indicate that exploitation in the un-
productive sectors intensified after early 2000s.10 This is because when the nominal value
added of the unproductive sectors increased and, later, stagnated — as shown in figure 9a
— the fact that the labor share fell more than the value of labor power did after around
early 2000s — as displayed in figure 8 — implies that, according to equation (7), WU/WP
decreased during this period; it is a short step from the rise in the share of the value added
9In relation to the discussion in section 2, we can examine the behavior of the value composition of capital
(VCC) using K/WP as a proxy. From the estimation, the result of which is omitted in this article, we have
observed that for both the whole economy and manufacturing the VCC increased during the two crisis
episodes and then stagnated after 2010. In particular, the rising trend has been weaker in manufacturing
than in the whole economy.
10Although value and surplus value are not produced in the unproductive industries, exploitation may
take place therein, as Duncan Foley states that exploitation “through the wage labor relation occurs when a
worker expends more labor hours than he or she receives an equivalent for in wages” (Foley, 1986, p. 122).
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Figure 9: The share of unproductive sectors, 1995–2015
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of the unproductive sectors and the decline in WU/WP to deriving a rise in the profit–wage
ratio of the unproductive sectors.11
In fact, our data demonstrate that exploitation in the unproductive sectors has inten-
sified throughout the entire sample period. On one hand, figure 9b charts the share of
unproductive activities in terms of employment and wage. It is readily observed that the
share of total employment of the unproductive sectors is rising whereas the share of their
total wage is falling albeit rather slowly. The combination of these two trajectories confirms
that exploitation in the unproductive industries strengthened throughout the sample period.
On the other hand, figure 10 more clearly and directly shows that the labor share of the
unproductive industries went through a sharp decline in the immediate aftermath of the
1997–8 crisis and has continue the downward trend thereafter.
The increase in the share of unproductive activities in Korea — as evidenced in figures
9a, 9b, and 10 — corresponds to the experience of other developed capitalist economies; for
the case of the U.S. economy, see, e.g., Paitaridis and Tsoulfidis (2012) and Basu and Fo-
ley (2013).12 Notice that the expansion of unproductive activities is considered in Marxian
11It should be noted, however, that this relation holds only under certain conditions.
12Paitaridis and Tsoulfidis (2012) document the rise in the share of the unproductive sectors in terms of
employment and wage whereas Basu and Foley (2013) focus on employment and value added. It should be
noted, however, that Basu and Foley (2013) adopted the distinction between service and non-service sector
which is less controversial than productive vs. unproductive industry distinction.
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Figure 10: Labor share in income of unproductive sectors, 1995–2015
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Table 2: The annual rate of change of the value of labor power and the rate of exploitation (%)
Exploitation rate Value of labor power Labor share
1996–2010 1.53 –0.56 –0.68
2011–2015 –1.46 0.96 1.03
economic theory as a threat to capital accumulation (Shaikh and Tonak, 1994; Paitaridis
and Tsoulfidis, 2012). In the case of Korean economy, however, the expansion of the unpro-
ductive activities doesn’t seem to have undermined the conditions for capital accumulation
in the Korean economy as it took place along with the strengthening of exploitation in the
unproductive sectors, which might have offset the negative effects of the expansion of the
unproductive activities.
Lastly, examining the dynamics of the three key variables reported thus far suggests
that our sample period can be divided into two sub–periods in the same way as in table 1.
The average annual rates of change of the value of labor power and the rate of exploitation
during 1996–2010 and 2011–2015 are summarized in table 2. The period of 1996–2010 is
characterized by a rise in the rate of exploitation and a decline in the value of labor power
and the labor share, whereas these trends are all reversed during the period of 2011–2015.
Tables 1 and 2 put together suggest that there is a structural break in our sample period
before and after around 2010–2011.
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4 Marxian value analysis: sectoral–level
Now let us plot the Marxian ratios at the industry level, aiming to gain more concrete
understanding of how the performance of manufacturing has related to the overall condition
of capital accumulation of the Korean economy. We will measure the MELT and the rate of
exploitation at the industry level. They describe two different dimensions of class conflict.
The former reveals the inter–industrial distribution of value whereas the latter describes
capital–labor distribution of value in each industry.
Two methodological comments follow before proceeding. First, as the MELT is measured
by national account data, our estimation of the industry–level MELTs reflect the end result
of distribution of value among industries. That is, it illustrates realization, rather than pro-
duction, of value in each industry. Therefore, an inverse transformation from price variables
to value variables is required for estimating the sectoral rates of surplus value. Second, since
it is only the productive sectors that produce value and surplus value while the source of
income generated in unproductive sectors is the value transfer from the productive sectors,
our measures of the MELT and the rate of surplus value at the industry level focus on the
productive sectors only.
4.1 Sectoral monetary expression of labor time
The MELT defined at the industrial level, denoted by mi, is expressed as
mi =
MVAi
Li
(8)
where MVAi and Li are money value added and total labor time of productive industry i.
In interpreting the relation between mi and m, we rely on Okishio (1956), where the
concept of ‘rate of income’, defined as income per unit of direct labor, is introduced and
used in analyzing the inter–industry value transfer; note that Okishio’s rate of income is
conceptuallly identical to the MELT. To be more specific, Okishio took the ratio between,
using our terminology, the MELT of the individual industry and the aggregate MELT, i.e.
mi
m
, as an index of unequal exchange among industries and interpreted the ratio greater than
one as implying gains from exchange while the ratio less than one as implying losses from
exchange.
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Figure 11: mim of productive industries (1995=1)
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When the productive–unproductive labor distinction is taken into account as in this
article, however, we need to consider that mi
m
< 1 is much more likely than not for most of
the productive sectors since there is a systematic value transfer to the unproductive sectors,
which do not produce value at all. In this sense, examining relative levels and overall trends
of mi
m
for the productive industries is more relevant when interpreting the relation between
mi and m, rather than asking whether the ratio is greater or less than one. Accordingly, we
consider an increase (a decrease) in mi
m
as implying that industry i’s position in the inter–
industrial value transfer is enhancing (weakening) and the conditions for industry i’s capital
accumulation in terms of both production and exchange are improving (deteriorating).
In this context, figure 11 compares the relative trends of mi
m
for the productive industries.
While the absolute levels are not reported here, most productive industries displayed mi
m
< 1
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as expected. Exceptions are utilities and information services where the industry’s MELT
is larger than the average and hence mi
m
> 1. One possible explanation is that these indus-
tries are characterized by natural monopoly; such industries are protected by entry barrier
from the competitive force of profit rate equalization through the process of surplus value
distribution. They have a market power of price control, which enables them to achieve an
higher–than–average level of MELT.13
On the other hand, the most interesting observation in figure 11 concerns manufacturing.
It uniquely exhibited a clear upward trend since the 1997-8 crisis and a clear downward
trend since 2011. That is, manufacturing was the only sector that experienced a persistent
improvement in the conditions for capital accumulation during the long period stretching
from the beginning of the sample period through around 2010; and, again, it is the only sector
that has gone through a persistent deterioration of the conditions for capital accumulation
from 2011 until the recent years.
In addition, the ratio mi
m
can also be used to estimate the value transfer from the pro-
ductive to unproductive sectors. To show this, let us first define the weighted average of mi
with the share of labor time of each industry as the weight and denote it by m∗. Then, we
have
m∗ =
∑
i
Li
LP
mi (9)
where LP =
∑
i Li, with i’s being productive industries. Next, note that there is a discrepancy
between MVAi and money value actually produced by industry i due to value transfer and
unequal exchange vis–à–vis the other productive and unproductive industries. If we define
MVAP =
∑
iMVAi, with i’s being productive industries, to denote the total money value
added of the productive industries as a whole,MVA−MVAP > 0 represents the magnitude
of the value transfer.
Furthermore, it can be easily verified that
m∗ = MVAP
LP
(10)
holds. Then, the difference between the aggregate MELT, m = MVA
LP
, and the weighted aver-
age of the productive industries, m∗ = MVAP
LP
, estimates the value per labor time transferred
13For more discussions on the determinants of the sectoral MELTs, see Rieu et al. (2014).
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Figure 12: The monetary expression of labor time: the economy versus the aggregate productive
sector, 1995–2015
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from productive to unproductive sectors; that is,
m−m∗ = MVA−MVAP
LP
> 0 (11)
Figure 12 charts historical evolutions of m and m∗ together. It is not only confirmed that
m > m∗ holds; it is also clearly observed that the magnitude of the value transfer per labor
time, indicated by the gap between the two trajectories, has steadily increased throughout the
entire sample period. This is another indication of the expansion of unproductive activities
in Korea that corresponds to the observations reported in figure 9.
4.2 Sectoral rates of exploitation
4.2.1 Theoretical background
The conventional assumption in Marxian economics that the sectoral rates of exploitation
converge to the average implies perfect competition in labor markets. While it can be useful
for a theoretical purpose as in the case of transformation of value into price of production,
it is unrealistic to adopt the assumption when dealing with data consisting of actual market
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prices.14 Prevailing observations about huge differences on working conditions depending on
workers’ eduation, skills, etc. make it unrealistic to assume that the exploitation conditions
tend to be equalized over time. For this reason, the central hypothesis in this section is that
there is no tendency for the sectoral rates of exploitation to converge to a unique value.
In order to verify whether there is any empirical support to our hypothesis, we conducted
panel unit root tests on the time series of the deviation of the sectoral rate of exploitation
from the mean. We used two different Augmented Dikcy–Fuller tests proposed by Im et al.
(2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999), respectively. For both tests, the null hypothesis is that
a unit root is present in all the time series, whereas the alternative hypothesis is that there
is no unit root in some of the time series. The fact that the time series of the deviation do
not have a unit root and hence are stationary implies that the deviations do not develop
permanently but are corrected by reverting to the mean. In contrast, the presence of a unit
root implies that the time series of the deviation are non–stationary and thus do not exhibit
mean reversion. Therefore, if the null is not rejected, we can safely discard the assumption
of the equalization of the sectoral rates of exploitation.
The test results are reported in table 3. It can be seen that the validity of our hypothesis
depends on the model specifications. At the significance level of 5%, the p–value larger than
0.05 can be taken as implying the presence of unit roots. Except for the model with a time
trend, the results suggest either moderately — in the case of the model without a time trend
— or strongly — in the case of the model without a drift and a time trend — that our
data do not display an equalization of the sectoral rates of exploitation. We conclude that
imposing the equality of the sectoral rates of exploitation would not fit well, at least, to the
case of the Korean economy during 1995–2015.15
The novel approach we propose here relies on the inverse transformation of a price variable
to a value variable. That is, instead of directly computing the sectoral rates of exploitation,
14See Rieu (2008) for the related theoretical issues.
15To our knowledge, Vaono (2011) is the only paper that procedes ours to use panel unit root tests to
examine the hypothesis of equalization of either the rate of profit or the rate of exploitation. As Vaono
(2011) studies three European countires with a larger data set than ours, the Choi (2001) test, which is
another available panel unit root test, is used in addition to the two tests we used; our data set is too small
to employ the Choi (2001) test. The results reported in Vaono (2011) more strongly support the hypothesis
that the sectoral rates of surplus value are not equalized.
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Table 3: Panel unit root tests on the rate of exploitation at the industry level: p–values
Im, Pearson, and Shin test Maddala and Wu test
Model without a drift and a time trend N/A 0.164
Model without a time trend 0.643 0.728
Model with a time trend 0.024 0.025
we first obtain the labor share at the industry level and from the latter derive the sectoral
rates of exploitation. Similarly to the case of measuring the labor share of the whole economy,
we decompose the income of self–employed of each industry into capital income and labor
income according to the profit–wage ratio of the industry in question.16 One of the problems
is that the income data of self–employed are available only at the aggregate level but not
at the industry level. In addressing this issue, we follow Jeon and Joo (2015)’s method to
distribute the total income of self–employed sector to each individual industry by taking
the wage differentials among the industries into consideration. Thus–distributed income of
self–employed in each industry is then decomposed into capital income and labor income
according to the profit–wage ratio of the industry.
Next we present the theoretical relation of the inverse transformation between the ex-
ploitation rate and the labor share in income at the industry level. Let us denote the labor
share in income of industry i by LSi and its value equivalent by LSV ALUEi . On the one hand,
LSV ALUEi is, by definition,
LSV ALUEi =
Vi
Vi + Si
= 1
1 + Si
Vi
= 11 + ei
(12)
where Vi, Si, and ei are variable capital, surplus value, and exploitation rate in industry i,
respectively. According to the NI, the exploitation rate of industry i can be computed as
follows.
ei =
m
wi
− 1 (13)
where wi denotes the wage rate in industry i; see Rieu (2008) for the derivation. Equation
(13) holds under the assumption that the value–creating capacity of the aggregate labor in
16See footnote 6.
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each industry is the same.17 Combining equations (12) and (13) yields
LSV ALUEi =
wi
m
(14)
On the other hand, LSi can be expressed as
LSi =
wi
mi
(15)
where mi is the MELT in industry i, i.e. the ratio between value added and labor time
defined in industry i. From equations (14) and (15), we obtain
LSV ALUEi =
mi
m
LSi (16)
which, when combined with equation (12), generates
ei =
1
LSV ALUEi
− 1 = m
miLSi
− 1 (17)
Equation (17) demonstrates the relation of inverse transformation and accordingly enables
deriving ei when LSi is given along with m and mi.
Furthermore, note that the profit–wage ratio in industry i corresponds to its exploitation
rate in price term; when the ratio is denoted by epi , it can be expressed as
epi =
1
LSi
− 1 (18)
From equations (17) and (18), the following relations can be obtained.
m R mi ⇐⇒ ei R epi (19)
It states that the deviation between m and mi, which reflects inter–industrial value transfer
and unequal exchange, is related to the deviation between the sectoral exploitation rate
and profit–wage ratio, which reflects the capital–labor distribution of value. In particular,
m > mi (m < mi) indicates that the exploitation is more (less) intense than when it is
measured by the labor share of income.
17The assumption of an equalized value–creating capacity of each industry’s aggregate labor is necessary
in measuring the sectoral rates of exploitation from the real–world data. Duménil et al. (2009) state that “[in]
order to recover a measure of this value productivity from real–world price and wage data by sector, some
additional assumption about relative rates of exploitation (which Marx often explicitly assumes to be equal)
is required”. Hahn and Rieu (2017) presents simulations that examine the consequence of the assumption
that the value–creating capacity of the aggregate labor in each industry is not the same.
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4.2.2 Estimation
In relation to the inequalities in (19), we report the rate of exploitation ei and the profit–wage
ratio epi at the industry level in figure 13. As expected, it is clearly noticeable that manufac-
turing has uniquely experienced the gap between the exploitation rate and the profit–wage
ratio getting shrunk until 2011, which implies a steady rise of mi
m
according to the relation in
equation (19); it is also observable that the gap has started to increase thereafter, implying
a decline of mi
m
. This result exactly corresponds to the dynamics of mi
m
of manufacturing as
displayed in figure 11. In all, the figure demonstrates that while manufacturing has exhibited
an upward secular trend of profit–wage ratio and a downward secular trend of exploitation
rate, its position in relation to the other productive and unproductive industries steadily
improved until 2011, after which it has started to get undermined.
We have also estimated the exploitation rates and the profit–wage ratios for manufac-
turing at two–digit industry level and reported in figure 14 the results for three major
manufacturing industries — electrical and electronic products; petroleum, coal, and chem-
ical manufacturing; transportation equipment. Note that the share of these three major
manufacturing industries in total manufacturing is, at an annual average, 65.6%, which rises
to 83% when metals is included.
The overall trend of electrics and electronics and that of coal, mining, and chemicals
seem to be the driver of the behavior of the entire manufacturing sector as they exhibit
similar shapes. In the case of transportation, however, it is somehow different. These three
manufacturing industries have the largest MELT among the entire manufacturing and are
marked by a declining trend in recent years after 2011. Six out of eleven manufacturing
industries with the MELT larger than the average, m∗, of the productive industries are
collected in figure 15.
One of the important results that emerge from the estimates of sectoral exploitation rates
in figures 13 and 14 in relation to our analyses in the previous sections has to do with the
performance of manufacturing; it witnessed a long stretch of improvement in its conditions
for capital accumulation amid the expansion of unproductive sectors and the consequent rise
in value transfer to the latter; this continued until 2011, after which the course has reversed.
We may relate these observations with the fact that for about a decade following the
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Figure 13: The exploitation rate and the profit–wage ratio at the industry level, 1995–2015
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Figure 14: The exploitation rates and the profit–wage ratios of manufacturing at two–digit in-
dustry level, 1995–2015
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Figure 15: The monetary expression of labor time: manufacturing at two–digit industry level,
1995–2015
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Figure 16: Foreign exchange rates, 1995–2015
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1997–8 crisis, export of manufacturing maintained a stable rise with the help of favorable
conditions in the global economy. For example, the manufacturing industry recorded 10.38%
sales growth rate during this ten year period, which however was lowered to –0.07% after
around 2010 due to the recessions in the global economy. Whether this structural change can
be explained by the fact that export–led growth regime has been dismantled as Uni (2017)
and Palley (2011) suggest is a question that requires further investigation. See, for instance,
figure 16 which displays exchange rates, one of the crucial conditions for export–led growth
regime. The Korean Won, after the sharp spike during the 1997–8 crisis episode, underwent
a long period of gradual appreciation against the US Dollar.
5 Conclusion
The neoliberal structuration since the 1997–8 crisis has made the globalization context in-
fluential in Korean economy. In this article, we examined Korean economy through the
perspective of Marxian value theory. In order to understand the structural change of the
conditions for capital accumulation, we focused on class analysis and inter–sectoral value
transfer by estimating the sectoral rates of exploitation along with the sectoral MELTs. One
of the novelties of this article, in particular, is to explicitly consider the self–employed sector,
which is uniquely high in the Korean economy, and decompose its income into capital income
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and labor income when measuring the sectoral rates of exploitation. Some of the key results
of this article are summarized as follows.
First, the value transfer from the productive industries to the unproductive industries
steadily increased after the 1997–8 crisis up until mid 2000s. At the same time, however,
exploitation in the unproductive industries markedly intensified, particularly so in the im-
mediate aftermath of the 1997–8 crisis. The combination of these two opposing tendencies
concerning capital accumulation may explain the fact that the conditions for capital accumu-
lation were not significantly undermined in Korea during 1995–2015 when the unproductive
activities steadily expanded.
The second result has to do with the uniqueness of manufacturing in the capital accu-
mulation of Korean capitalist economy. Manufacturing maintained a consistently high level
of the rate of exploitation during most of the period, but experienced a decreasing trend at
around mid 2000s. Its MELT was on a steady rise until 2011, after which it started to fall.
More importantly, manufacturing was the only productive industry that witnessed a fall in
the value transfer to the other industries until around 2010; then afterwards, again, it was
the only productive industry where the value transfer increased. It can be concluded that
the condition for manufacturing’s capital accumulation steadily improved since the 1997–8
crisis, but started to deteriorate after 2011.
Globalization factors such as moving factories overseas might have been crucial for the
improvement of the conditions for capital accumulation of manufacturing achieved amidst the
steady rise in the unproductive sectors. However, the conditions for export–led growth has
started to collapse since 2010, and the Korean economy has thereafter entered a conjuncture
that requires a regime change towards domestic demand–led growth. Our value–theoretic
analysis provides a foundation for understanding the context of the regime change, which
may plausibly characterize the Korean economy last couple of decades.
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Appendix Data
The sources of the data used in this article are as follows:
• Assets, value added, and income used for computing Piketty’s β, income distribution,
profit rates, capital productivity, and the MELT come from National Accounts by Bank
of Korea available at https://ecos.bok.or.kr.
• Employment data used for computing income distribution and the MELT are obtained
from Korean Statistical Information Service by Korea National Statistical Office avail-
able at https://kosis.kr.
• Working hours data used for computing income distribution and the MELT are ob-
tained from Survey Report on Labor Conditions by Employment Type published by
Ministry of Employment and Labor available at http://laborstat.molab.go.kr.
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